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Abstract 
This paper extends our previous paper (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008) and explores some 
of the unexplored questions. First, we examine the channels through which the trilemma 
policy configurations affect output volatility. Secondly, we investigate how trilemma policy 
configurations affect the output performance of the economies under severe crisis situations. 
Thirdly, we look into how trilemma configurations have evolved in the aftermath of economic 
crises in the past. We find that trilemma policy configurations and external finances affect 
output volatility mainly through the investment channel. While a higher degree of exchange 
rate stability could stabilize the real exchange rate movement, it could also make investment 
volatile, though the volatility-enhancing effect of exchange rate stability on investment can be 
cancelled by holding higher levels of international reserves (IR). Greater financial openness 
helps reduce real exchange rate volatility. These results indicate that policymakers in a more 
open economy would prefer pursuing greater exchange rate stability and greater financial 
openness while holding a massive amount of IR. We also find that the “crisis economies” 
could end up with smaller output losses if they entered the crisis situation with more stable 
exchange rates or if they continue to hold a high level of IR and maintain greater exchange 
rate stability during the crisis period. Lastly, we find that developing countries are often found 
to have decreased the level of monetary independence and financial openness, but 
increased the level of exchange rate stability in the aftermath of a crisis, especially for the 
last two decades. This finding indicates how vulnerable developing countries, especially 
emerging market ones, are to volatile capital flows as a result of global financial liberalization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 in the United States (US), but spread far and wide 
across borders, had dire consequences for economic growth. While the extent of economic 
damage varied across countries, economists agree that the current downturn is the worst since 
the Great Depression. Even now, in the fall of 2009, there are only limited signs that global 
recession has ended.  
Just as the traumas of the Great Depression and World War II underpinned an initiative to set 
up a stable international financial architecture, the ongoing crisis has sparked a call for action. 
That action began with the October 2008 meeting of the G20. But that meeting took place in the 
midst of the financial panic. As the G20 prepared to meet in Pittsburgh, it seemed that the time 
was ripe for a comprehensive reevaluation of the international financial architecture – one that 
would probably be accompanied by changes in the macroeconomic policy combinations 
adopted by countries. 
Whatever configuration of international financial architecture policy leaders consider, they 
cannot avoid confronting the central policy trilemma in international finance, the existence of the 
“impossible trinity.” The trilemma thesis states that a country simultaneously may choose any 
two, but not all, of the following three goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, 
and financial integration.  
A number of different international monetary and financial arrangements have been in place 
since the gold standard system. Each set of arrangements imposed different choices on 
countries. The Bretton Woods system sacrificed capital mobility for monetary autonomy and 
exchange rate stability. The Euro system is built upon the fixed exchange rate arrangement and 
free capital mobility, but abandoned monetary autonomy of the member countries. Until 
recently, developing countries largely pursued monetary independence and exchange rate 
stability, at the expense of financial openness. 
Although the trilemma has widespread adherence in both policy and academic circles, there has 
been almost no empirical work testing the concept. Our previous paper (Aizenman, Chinn, and 
Ito 2008) is one of the few exceptions.1 In that paper, we first developed the “trilemma indexes” 
that quantify exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and financial openness. Using 
these indexes, we have shown that the major crises in the last four decades—the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, the debt crisis of 1982, and the Asian crisis of 1997–98— caused 
structural breaks in the configuration of the trilemma indexes. We also tested whether the 
indexes are linearly related to each other and confirmed that a change in one of the trilemma 
variables induces a change with the opposite sign in the weighted average of the other two. This 
means countries do face a trade-off of the three policy choices. Armed with these results, we 
feel confident in predicting that the present turbulence in the global financial markets will 
challenge the current configuration of trilemma choices among countries.  
In Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008), we also investigated the normative question of how the 
policy choices among the three trilemma policies affect macroeconomic performances such as 
output volatility, inflation volatility, and the average rate of inflation. We found countries with 
higher levels of monetary independence tend to experience lower output volatility. We also 
found that emerging market economies with higher levels of exchange rate fixity tend to 
experience higher output volatility, though this effect can be mitigated if they hold international 
reserves at a level higher than 19–22% of gross domestic product (GDP). This result is 
                                                
1 Of course, the notable exceptions include the papers by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005, 2008, and 2009) 
and Shambaugh (2004). 
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consistent with the observation of many emerging market countries holding massive foreign 
exchange reserves.  
We also found that countries with greater monetary autonomy tend to experience higher 
inflation, while countries with higher exchange rate stability tend to experience lower inflation. 
Furthermore, financial openness helps a country to experience lower inflation, possibly 
indicating that globalization gives developing countries more discipline than monetary autonomy 
to a country’s macroeconomic management.  
While our previous paper shed important light on how the choices between trilemma policies 
can affect macroeconomic performance, we did not address other important questions relevant 
to the ongoing financial crisis. This paper deals with those questions. We first identify the 
channels by which the trilemma policy choices affect output volatility. Second, we focus on the 
performance of the economies in crisis, and investigate how trilemma policy configurations 
affect the output loss experienced by these economies. Thirdly, we look into how trilemma 
configurations have evolved in the aftermath of economic crises in the past, hoping to get some 
implications for the current crisis. 
Section 2 reviews the development of policy configurations based on the trilemma using our 
“trilemma indexes” (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2008). In Section 3, we revisit the statistical 
analysis of the effect of trilemma policy configurations on macroeconomic performances, 
namely, output volatility, inflation volatility, and the average rate of inflation, and focus on the 
channels through which international macroeconomic policy configurations affect output 
volatility. In Section 4, we investigate the determinants of output losses when a country 
experiences an economic hardship, not necessarily currency or banking crises. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRILEMMA DIMENSIONS 
In Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2008), we demonstrated that major crises in the last four 
decades—the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the debt crisis of 1982, and the Asian 
crisis of 1997–98—caused structural breaks in the trilemma configurations. Here, we revisit the 
development of policy configurations pertaining to the trilemma and international reserves (IR) 
holding, using the updated “trilemma indexes.”  
The “trilemma indexes” quantify the degree of achievement along three the dimensions for more 
than 170 countries for the period of 1970 through 2007. The monetary independence index 
depends on the correlation of a country’s interest rates with the base country’s interest rate, the 
exchange rate stability index is measured by the exchange rate volatility, and the degree of 
financial integration is measured with the Chinn-Ito (Chinn and Ito 2006, 2008) capital controls 
index. Additional details on the construction of the indexes can be found in the Appendix.  
2.1 Development of the Trilemma Configurations over Time 
Comparing theses indexes provides some interesting insights into how the international financial 
architecture has evolved over time. Figure 1 shows the development paths of the trilemma 
indexes for different country groups.  
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Figure 1: Development of the Trilemma Configurations Over Time: 1960–2008  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
